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Components of Consumer Drones
• Common figurations include:

• CPU/RAM
• Wi-Fi/RF communications
• Camera
• Storage
• Sensors
• Aeronautical hardware
• A controller for manual flight operations
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A drone is a flying computer …

Caveats
• This is preliminary research, much more to come
• Experimenting with a single, older (and no longer manufactured)
drone borrowed from Aeronautical Sciences
• Results are not necessarily generalizable to other drones
• This is a replication and extension of previously published research

Parrot AR.Drone 2.0

Step 1: Identify Vulnerabilities

Telnet and FTP provide remote
access to the drone …
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Login from Raspberry PI to AR.Drone
Access doesn’t require
a user ID or a password!!

Login from Raspberry PI to AR.Drone
I’m now running as ‘root’ which is
the same as ‘Administrator’ under
Windows (“God”-like user)

Let’s snoop around to see
what we can find …

Destructive commands

Destructive commands

Let’s perform some attacks …

Can we download/upload files
from the drone?
(via File Transfer Protocol)

Denial-of-Service through
De-authentication …
(like hanging up a phone call)
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Can we eavesdrop?

Let’s listen in on the video
feed …

Capture the communications from the drone on the video channel.

Drone

Controller

Video channel

Video frames are wrapped by
Parrot Video Encapsulation (PaVE),
proprietary encapsulation format

Still working on ‘unwrapping’
the video…

Let’s eavesdrop on ALL of the
communications…

AT commands are
instructions to control
the drone

Finally, let’s turn the d*mn thing off

Conclusions
• Using it’s default settings, the AR.Drone 2.0 has several
security vulnerabilities
• No authentication (username/password)
• Commands are run as root (“God”)
• Eavesdrop: No encryption of the data and controller links
• Denial-of-service through de-authentication or poweroff
• Issues with system integrity as many destructive Linux
commands are available
• Files can be downloaded and uploaded to/from the drone

Future Research
• Implement other exploits on the AR.Drone
• GPS jamming and/or spoofing

• Jamming is illegal … FCC “no muy bueno” ...
• MITM
• Unwrap the PaVE video

• Vulnerability assessments on other drones
• Parrot
• DJI
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